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Abstract
This paper investigates the dynamic stability of an adaptive learn-
ing procedure in a traffic game. Using the Routh-Hurwitz criterion we
study the stability of the rest points of the corresponding mean field
dynamics. In the special case with two routes and two players we pro-
vide a full description of the number and nature of these rest points as
well as the global asymptotic behavior of the dynamics. Depending on
the parameters of the model, we find that there are either one, two or
three equilibria and we show that in all cases the mean field trajectories
converge towards a rest point for almost all initial conditions.
Keywords: Congestion games, adaptive learning dynamics, stochastic al-
gorithms, routing equilibrium, dynamical systems, stability, Routh-Hurwitz
criterion.
AMS subject classification: 91A05, 91A06, 91A10, 91A15, 91A25, 91A26,
91A60.
∗This work was partially supported by FONDECYT 1130564 and Complex Engineering
Systems Institute, ISCI (ICM-FIC: P05-004-F, CONICYT: FB0816).
†Computational Science Research Center, San Diego State University, California, USA;
(mdumett@sdsu.edu).
‡Facultad de Ingenier´ıa y Ciencias, Universidad Adolfo Iba´n˜ez, Santiago, Chile;
(roberto.cominetti@uai.cl).
1
1 Introduction
Traffic in congested networks is frequently modeled as a game among drivers,
with equilibrium interpreted as a steady state that emerges from some un-
specified adaptive mechanism in driver behavior. This is the case in Rosen-
thal’s model where drivers are taken as individual players [44], in Wardrop’s
non-atomic equilibrium with traffic modeled by continuous flows [48], and in
stochastic equilibrium with routing decisions based on random choice models
[17, 20]. Empirical evidence for the existence of some adaptive mechanism
that leads to equilibrium has been presented in [4, 33, 37, 46].
There is a vast literature dealing with adaptive dynamics in repeated games.
The most prominent procedure is fictitious play which assumes that at each
stage players choose a best response to the empirical distribution of past
moves by their opponents [13, 43], or a smooth best response using a Logit
random choice [24, 30]. For large games this can be very demanding as it
requires to monitor the moves of all players. A milder assumption is that
players observe only the payoff obtained at every stage. Procedures such
as exponential weight [23, 3], calibration [21, 22], and no-regret [27, 28, 29],
deal with such limited information situations: players build statistics of their
past performance and infer what the outcome would have been if a different
strategy had been played. Eventually, adaptation leads to a steady state in
which no player regrets the choices she makes. For a complete account of
these dynamics we refer to the monographs [24, 49].
A simpler discrete time adaptive process was considered in [14] using only the
sequence of realized payoffs. The idea is similar to reinforcement dynamics
[2, 5, 10, 19, 36, 42], though it differs in the way the state is defined as
well as in how this state affects the player’s decisions. Namely, at every
stage n ∈ N each player i ∈ I selects a route rin ∈ R at random with Logit
probabilities piirn=pi
ir(xin) (see (3) in the next section) where the vector x
i
n =
(xirn )r∈R is a state variable that represents player i’s estimates of the average
travel times on all possible routes r ∈ R. The collective choices of all the
players determine the random load urn of each route and the corresponding
travel times Crurn . Each player i then observes the travel time of the route
r = rin that was chosen and updates her estimate for that particular route
as a weighted average between xirn and the observed travel time C
r
urn
. This
procedure is repeated day after day, generating a discrete time stochastic
process.
A basic question is whether this simple adaptive mechanism induces coor-
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dination among players and leads towards an equilibrium. A partial answer
was provided in [14] using results in stochastic approximation [7, 34] by
studying the associated mean field dynamics
x˙ir = piir(xi)(Cir(x-i)− xir) ∀ i ∈ I, r ∈ R, (1)
where Cir(·) is the expected travel time of route r conditional on the event
that player i chooses this route (a detailed description is given in the next
section). The rest points of (1) turn out to be Nash equilibria for an underly-
ing perturbed game. Moreover, when the Logit parameters are small enough
there is a unique rest point which is a global attractor, and the stochastic
process converges almost surely towards this equilibrium [14].
In this paper we explore what happens for larger values of the Logit pa-
rameters in terms of the number and nature of the rest points of the mean
field dynamics (1). The paper is organized as follows. In §2 we review the
model for the adaptive dynamics in the traffic game, including a precise
description of the stochastic process and the mean field dynamics. In §3 we
discuss the Routh-Hurwitz criterion for stability of equilibria, providing an
explicit expression for the Jacobian of (1). Our main results are presented
in §4 and deal with the asymptotic stability of equilibria for a 2 × 2 traffic
game. Specifically, in §4.1 we exploit the Routh-Hurwitz criterion to derive
a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of rest points.
Then, in §4.2 we show that there can be only one, two or three equilibria,
and we determine their stability. Next, in §4.3 we show that the mean field
dynamics are K-monotone for a suitable order ≤K , from which we deduce
that the forward orbits of (1) converge towards a rest point for almost all
initial conditions. Finally, in §4.4 we consider the case in which both players
are identical. In this case there is a special symmetric equilibrium whose
stability can be characterized explicitly in terms of the parameters defin-
ing the model, and we show that when the symmetric rest point becomes
unstable there appear two additional non-symmetric stable equilibria.
2 Adaptive dynamics in a simple traffic game
Consider a set of routes R = {1, . . . ,M} which are used concurrently by a
finite set of drivers I = {1, . . . , N}. The travel time of each route r ∈ R
depends on the number of drivers on that route and is given by a non-
decreasing sequence
Cr1 ≤ Cr2 ≤ · · · ≤ CrN . (2)
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Suppose that each driver i ∈ I chooses a route ri ∈ R at random with Logit
probabilities
P(ri=r) =
exp(−βixir)∑
s∈R exp(−βixis)
, piir(xi) ∀ r ∈ R (3)
where the vector xi = (xir)r∈R describes the driver’s a priori estimate of the
travel time of each possible route. The parameter βi > 0 is a characteristic
of the player and captures how sensitive is the driver to differences of costs:
for βi small the probability distribution pii(x
i) is roughly uniform over R,
whereas for βi large it assigns higher probabilities to routes with smaller
travel time estimates xir.
Let Y ir=1{ri=r} be the random variable indicating whether driver i selects
route r. The load of route r is ur=
∑
i∈I Y
ir (the number of drivers that have
chosen to utilize that route) which induces a random travel time Crur . Hence,
while the route choice of driver i is based solely on her own estimate xi, the
route travel times depend on the collective choices of all players.
Following [14], we consider a dynamical model in which the estimates xir
evolve in discrete time as a weighted average of travel times experienced in
the past. Formally, on day n ∈ N each driver i ∈ I chooses a route rin ∈ R
at random according to the Logit probabilities (3) based on her current
estimate vector xin. After observing the travel time of the chosen route
rin, player i ∈ I updates her estimate for this route as a weighted average
between the previous estimate and the new observation, keeping unchanged
the estimates for the routes that were not observed, namely
xirn+1 =
{
(1−αn)xirn + αnCrurn for r = rin
xirn for r 6= rin
(4)
where αn ∈ (0, 1) is the weight assigned to the new observation. This discrete
time Markov process can be written as a Robbins-Monro process
xir
n+1
−xirn
αn
= Y irn (C
r
urn
− xirn ) ∀ i ∈ I, r ∈ R (5)
which can be analyzed using the ODE method in stochastic approxima-
tion. Indeed, under the mild conditions
∑
n≥0 αn = ∞ and
∑
n≥0 α
2
n < ∞,
the asymptotic behavior of this stochastic process is closely related to the
asymptotics of the mean field dynamics
x˙ir = Epi[Y
ir(Crur − xir)] ∀ i ∈ I, r ∈ R (6)
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where Epi[·] denotes expectation with respect to the probability distribution
induced by the player’s choice probabilities pii = pii(x
i) for all i ∈ I. Specifi-
cally, if (6) has a global attractor x∗ ∈ RMN then the stochastic process (4)
converges almost surely towards x∗, whereas a local attractor has a positive
probability of being attained as the limit of xn. This raises the question of
characterizing the local attractors of the mean field dynamics (6).
Before proceeding let us introduce some notation. We denote x = (xi)i∈I the
vector of player’s estimates, and x-i = (xj)j 6=i the estimates of all the drivers
except i. The vector field defining (6) can be expressed more explicitly by
conditioning on the random variable Y ir. Denoting ur-i =
∑
j 6=i Y
jr we
have
x˙ir = piir(xi)(Cir(x-i)− xir) ∀ i ∈ I, r ∈ R, (7)
where
Cir(x-i) = Epi[C
r
ur |Y ir=1] = Epi[Cr1+ur-i ]. (8)
Note that the latter depends only on the choice probabilities pirj = pi
r
j (x
j) of
the drivers j 6= i, namely
Cir(x-i) =
N−1∑
u=0
Cr1+u P(u
r
-i=u)
=
N−1∑
u=0
Cr1+u
∑
A⊆I\{i}
|A| = u
∏
j∈A
pirj
∏
j /∈A
(1−pirj ). (9)
3 Rest points and dynamic stability
Let S denote the set of rest points of the dynamics (7), that is to say, the
solutions of the fixed-point equations
xir = Cir(x-i) ∀ i ∈ I, r ∈ R. (10)
The existence of rest points follows directly from Brower’s fixed point theo-
rem, for all possible values of the parameters βi and C
r
u. From a structural
viewpoint we note that (10) involves only polynomial and exponential func-
tions and therefore S is a definable set in the o-minimal structure Ralg,exp
known as the real exponential field [47, Example 1.7]. It follows that S has
finitely many connected components. In fact, from [15, Theorem 3.12], there
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is an integer k which depends only on N and M such that S has at most k
connected components for all possible values of the parameters. Moreover,
for each i ∈ I and r ∈ R the projection Sir = {xir : x ∈ S} onto the real
line is a finite union of intervals and points.
Now, according to [14, Theorem 10], if we have ω∆ < 2 where
ω = max
i∈I
∑
j 6=i βj
∆ = max
r∈R
max
u=2,...,N
Cru − Cru−1
then (7) has a unique rest point x∗ which is moreover a global attractor
for the continuous time dynamics, and the stochastic process (4) satisfies
xn → x∗ almost surely. The condition ω∆ < 2 holds when either the βi’s
are small (i.e. the players are mildly sensitive to travel time differences) or
the congestion jump ∆ is small (i.e. travel times do not vary too much with
increasing congestion). In this paper we are concerned with the study of the
dynamic stability of the rest points of the mean field dynamics (7) beyond
this regime when ω∆ ≥ 2.
3.1 The Jacobian of (7) and Routh-Hurwitz stability
Let G : RNM → RNM with Gir(x) = piir(xi)(Cir(x-i)−xir) be the vector field
that defines the mean field dynamics (7). A rest point x ∈ S is a linearly
stable local attractor if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
J(x) =
(
∂Gir
∂xks
(x)
)
i,k∈I;r,s∈R
have strictly negative real part. The next Lemma provides an explicit expres-
sion for this Jacobian. For notational convenience we will omit the variables
and write ∂G
ir
∂xks
instead of ∂G
ir
∂xks
(x) and piir in place of piir(xi). We also use
the Kronecker delta δij which is equal to 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ S be a rest point for the dynamics (7). For each r ∈ R
and i, k ∈ I let us denote ur-ik =
∑
j 6=i,k Y
jr and define
Λrik =
{
Epi[C
r
2+ur-ik
− Cr1+ur-ik ] if k 6= i,
0 if k = i.
Then the Jacobian J(x) has entries
∂Gir
∂xks
= piir
(
βkpi
r
k(pi
s
k − δrs)Λrik − δikδrs
)
. (11)
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Proof. Since a rest point x ∈ S satisfies Cir(x-i) = xir it follows that
∂Gir
∂xks
=
∂piir
∂xks
(Cir(x-i)− xir) + piir ∂
∂xks
(Cir(x-i)− xir)
= piir(∂C
ir
∂xks
− δikδrs). (12)
In order to compute ∂C
ir
∂xks
we note that Cir(x-i) does not depend on xi so
that for k = i these derivatives are all zero. On the other hand, for k 6= i the
function Cir(x-i) depends on xks only as an affine function of pirk = pi
r
k(x
k).
More precisely, conditioning on Y kr in the expression (8) we get
Cir(x-i) = pirk Epi[C
r
2+ur-ik
] + (1−pirk) Epi[Cr1+ur-ik ]
= Epi[C
r
1+ur-ik
] + pirk Epi[C
r
2+ur-ik
− Cr1+ur-ik ]
from which it follows that
∂Cir
∂xks
= Λrik
∂pirk
∂xks
. (13)
Now, for the Logit probabilities (3) we have
∂pirk
∂xks
=
{ −βkpirk(1−pirk) if s = r
βkpi
r
kpi
s
k if s 6= r
which combined with (13) and replaced into (12) yields (11).
Using (11) we have more explicitly
for k = i
∂Gir
∂xis
=
{ −piir if s = r
0 if s 6= r (14)
for k 6= i ∂G
ir
∂xks
=
{ −βkpiirpirk(1−pirk)Λrik if s = r
βkpi
irpirkpi
s
k Λ
r
ik if s 6= r.
(15)
Note that since Cru increases with u we have Λ
r
ik ≥ 0 and the derivatives
have a definite sign: ∂G
ir
∂xks
≤ 0 if s = r and ∂Gir
∂xks
≥ 0 for s 6= r.
It follows that the Jacobian can be organized into N2 blocks as
J =


J11 · · · J1N
...
. . .
...
JN1 · · · JNN

 ,
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where the blocks J ik are of order M ×M and are given by
J ii = −diag((piir)r∈R), (16)
J ik =
(
βkpi
irpirk(pi
s
k − δsr)Λrik
)
r,s∈R
. (17)
Each block J ik has negative diagonal and positive off-diagonal entries, and
trace(J ii) = −∑r∈R piir = −1 so that
trace(J) =
N∑
i=1
trace(J ii) = −N. (18)
In order to determine stability of an equilibrium x ∈ S, we must verify that
all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian J have negative real part. The eigenvalues
are the roots of the characteristic polynomial p(λ) = det(λI−J), which can
be expanded as
p(λ) = a0λ
n + a1λ
n−1 + · · ·+ an−1λ+ an
with a0 = 1, a1 = −trace(J) = N and an = (−1)ndet(J).
The Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion states that all the roots of the real
polynomial p(λ) (with a0 > 0) have negative real part if and only if the
leading minors {∆k(p)}nk=1 of the Hurwitz matrix below are positive
H(p) =


a1 a3 a5 · · · · · · · · · 0 0 0
a0 a2 a4
.
..
.
..
.
..
0 a1 a3
...
...
...
... a0 a2
. . . 0
...
...
..
. 0 a1
. . . an
..
.
..
.
...
... a0
. . . an−1 0
...
...
... 0 an−2 an
...
...
...
... an−3 an−1 0
0 0 0 · · · · · · · · · an−4 an−2 an


. (19)
This matrix has diagonal entries a1, . . . , an and each column contains the
coefficients ai in decreasing order with the convention ai = 0 for i < 0 and
i > n. Recall that a leading or principal minor is the determinant of the
square sub-matrix obtained by keeping only the first k rows and columns.
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In our case a0 = 1 and a1 = N , and the first four leading minor conditions
are
0 < ∆1(p) = N, (20)
0 < ∆2(p) = Na2 − a3, (21)
0 < ∆3(p) = (Na2 − a3)a3 +Na5 −N2a4, (22)
0 < ∆4(p) = N(a2a3a4 +Na2a6 + a4a5 − a3a6 − a5a22 −Na24)
− (a4a23 + a25 +Na2a7 − a3a7 − a2a3a5 −Na4a5). (23)
Note that when n = 4 we have a5 = a6 = a7 = 0 so that the expression (23)
factorizes as a4∆3(p) and the condition ∆4(p) > 0 reduces to a4 > 0.
Remark. The expression of ∆k(p) becomes increasingly complex as k grows.
It is worth noting that, according to [18, Dimitrov and Pen˜a], a sufficient
condition for stability is that ak > 0 and akak+1 ≥ z¯ ak−1ak+2 for all k =
1, . . . , n−2 where z¯ ≈ 4.08 is the unique real root of z3−5z2+4z−1 = 0.
The Routh-Hurwitz criterion provides necessary and sufficient conditions for
the asymptotic stability of the rest points of a system of nonlinear differ-
ential equations, and it can be applied even without solving explicitly the
steady state equations that arise by setting the time derivatives to zero.
This tool is frequently utilized in the study of dynamical systems, especially
in mathematical biology and control system theory, but it has also appeared
occasionally in the context of games. It was mentioned by Hofbauer and
Sigmund in [32, Example 15.6.10] in connection with the stability of linear
Lotka-Volterra systems and replicator dynamics in games, and it was also
suggested by Cressman in [16, Section 3] as a plausible tool to characterize
the evolutionary stable strategies in multi-species systems. Unlike these ex-
amples, which describe the aggregate evolution of the frequency of strategies
in a population game, in this paper we apply the criterion to analyze the
adaptive behavior of individual players in a finite congestion game.
The Routh-Hurwitz criterion is more general than other stability criteria.
For instance, the Nyquist criterion in control theory is restricted to linear
time-invariant systems, while its generalization known as the Circle criterion
applies only for suitably small nonlinear perturbations. Other criteria, such
as Lyapunov stability, examine how quickly the convergence of trajectories
near a stable equilibria occurs, by constructing a potential function. Like
Routh-Hurwitz, the Lyapunov criterion does not need to find the steady
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states of the system to determine their stability, but it relies on the abil-
ity to find an appropriate potential. In this sense Routh-Hurwitz is sim-
pler as it only requires to examine the signs of certain sub-determinants of
the Jacobian matrix of the system. On the down side, as the dimension
of the system increases the Routh-Hurwitz criterion must deal with larger
sub-determinants which may become cumbersome. However, for moderate
dimensions it can be used to fully characterize the stability of rest points,
as in the case of the learning dynamics in the 2× 2 routing game considered
in the next section.
4 Symmetric 2× 2 traffic game
In this section we consider the special case in which we have only two routes
r = a, b and two drivers i = 1, 2. In this case the system (10) becomes
x1a = Ca1pi
2b + Ca2pi
2a = Ca1 + (C
a
2−Ca1 )pi2a
x1b = Cb1pi
2a + Cb2pi
2b = Cb2 + (C
b
1−Cb2)pi2a
x2a = Ca1pi
1b + Ca2pi
1a = Ca1 + (C
a
2−Ca1 )pi1a
x2b = Cb1pi
1a + Cb2pi
1b = Cb2 + (C
b
1−Cb2)pi1a
(24)
4.1 Stability of equilibria
In order to give a simpler expression for the characteristic polynomial p(λ)
it is convenient to introduce the constants
δa = Ca2−Ca1
δb = Cb2−Cb1
δ = δa + δb
ν = β1β2.
(25)
Lemma 2. For i = 1, 2 let zi = pi
iapiib and yi = pi
iaδa + piibδb, and denote
Z = z1z2
S = z1 + z2
;
Y = y1y2
P = z1y2 + z2y1.
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Then, the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian (30) is given by
p(λ) = λ4 + 2λ3 + a2λ
2 + a3λ+ a4 (26)
a2 = 1 + S − νZY (27)
a3 = S − νδZP (28)
a4 = Z(1− νδ2Z). (29)
Proof. Using (16)-(17) the Jacobian J can be expressed as
J =


−pi1a 0 −β2z2pi1aδa β2z2pi1aδa
0 −pi1b β2z2pi1bδb −β2z2pi1bδb
−β1z1pi2aδa β1z1pi2aδa −pi2a 0
β1z1pi
2bδb −β1z1pi2bδb 0 −pi2b

 . (30)
From this expression the computation of the characteristic polynomial p(λ)
is a routine exercise and is omitted.
In the sequel we will see that the sign of a4 plays a crucial role in determining
the stability of the rest point. To this end we will first establish some useful
inequalities for the coefficients of the characteristic poynomial.
Lemma 3. The following inequalities hold
2a2 − a3 ≥ S + 2a4/Z (31)
a3 ≥ Sa4/Z (32)
with strict inequality unless δ = 0. Moreover, if a4 ≥ 0 we have 2a2−a3 > 0,
a2 > 0, and a3 > 0.
Proof. We note that yi = pi
iaδa + piibδb ≤ δ so that Y ≤ δ2 and P ≤ δS.
Moreover, these inequalities are strict unless δ = 0. From (27)-(28) we get
2a2 − a3 = S + νδZP + 2(1 − νZY )
≥ S + νδZP + 2(1 − νδ2Z)
and (31) follows since νδZP ≥ 0 with strict inequality unless δ = 0. Also
a3 = S − νδZP ≥ S − νδ2ZS = Sa4/Z
again with strict inequality unless δ = 0.
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Let us suppose now that a4 ≥ 0. Since S > 0, from (31) we get 2a2−a3 > 0
while (32) gives a3 ≥ 0 which together imply a2 > 0. It remains to show
that a3 > 0. From (32) this is clear if a4 > 0. Otherwise, when a4 = 0 we
have νδ2Z = 1 so that δ > 0 and the inequality (32) is strict.
Using the previous Lemma we can establish that the rest point is stable if
and only if a4 > 0. The proof exploits the fact that X and Y are strictly
positive while Z and W are non-negative.
Theorem 1. Let x ∈ S be a rest point for a 2× 2 game with corresponding
Logit probabilities piir. Then x is a stable point for (7) if and only if a4 > 0,
that is to say
νδ2 pi1api1bpi2api2b < 1. (33)
Proof. As noted in the previous section, the Routh-Hurwitz conditions (20)-
(23) are equivalent to
2a2 − a3 > 0, (34)
(2a2 − a3)a3 − 4a4 > 0, (35)
a4 > 0. (36)
From (29) we see that (36) is equivalent to νδ2Z < 1 which is exactly (33).
Now, Lemma 3 shows that when a4 > 0 we have 2a2 − a3 > S so that (36)
implies (34). Moreover, combining this inequality with (32) we get
(2a2 − a3)a3 − 4a4 > S2a4/Z − 4a4 = (z1 − z2)2a4/Z ≥ 0
showing that (36) also implies (35). Hence, (34) and (35) are superfluous
and the Routh-Hurwitz stability stability conditions are reduced to (33).
Since piia + piib = 1, the stability condition (33) can be written as
pi1a(1−pi1a)pi2a(1−pi2a) < (νδ2)−1
which are level sets of the function f(x, y) = x(1 − x)y(1 − y). Figure 1
plots this funtion and the contours of its level sets. The region of stability is
the sector comprised between the corresponding contour and the boundary
of the rectangle [0, 1]2. Since the maximum of f(x, y) is attained at (12 ,
1
2 )
with value 116 , it follows that when νδ
2 < 16 the stability region is the full
rectangle [0, 1]2 and all equilibria are stable.
When a4 = 0 the characteristic polynomial can be factored as p(λ) = λq(λ)
with q(λ) = λ3 + 2λ2 + a2λ + a3. So p(λ) has a null eigenvalue. Applying
12
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Figure 1: Stability region in the 2× 2 traffic game
the Routh-Hurwitz criterion to q(λ) and using the inequalities 2a2 − a3 > 0
and a3 > 0 in Lemma 3, it follows that the other three eigenvalues of p(λ)
have negative real part. Therefore, the equilibrium is still stable.
When a4 becomes negative we have p(0) = a4 < 0 and since p(±∞) = ∞
it follows that there are at least one negative and one positive eigenvalue so
that the rest point is an unstable saddle point for the dynamics. In fact,
by a continuity argument, when a4 is slightly negative, a2 and a3 are still
positive and p(λ) will have exactly one positive root and the other three
roots have negative real part. Hence, for a4 slightly positive, the rest point
is unstable due to a crossing of the imaginary axis of a simple real negative
root. This does not discard the presence of a Hopf bifurcation or other more
complex dynamical behavior. The non-existence of Hopf bifurcation will be
established later by a Ks-monotonicity argument.
Although we have established the existence of rest points, we have not yet
determined how many of these equilibria exist. Using a fixed-point argument
based on a one dimensional dynamical map associated with the dynamical
system, we will see that depending on the values of the parameters there
may be multiple equilibria.
4.2 Counting stable and unstable equilibria
We claim that in the 2 × 2 case there are either one, two or three rest
points. To see this we reduce (24) to a fixed point equation in dimension one.
Namely, we note that a solution x of (24) is fully determined once we know
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pi1a and pi2a. Moreover, denoting wi = βi(x
ia−xib) these Logit probabilities
are piia = ρ(wi) where ρ(w) = 1/[1+exp(w)] so that (24) can be reduced to a
2×2 system in the unknowns w1 and w2. Indeed, substracting the equations
in each block of (24) and setting ϕ(w) = κ + δρ(w) with κ = Ca1 − Cb2, we
get
w1 = β1 ϕ(w
2)
w2 = β2 ϕ(w
1).
(37)
Hence w1 is a fixed point of the scalar function ψ(w) , β1ϕ(β2ϕ(w)), which
yields a solution of (37) with w2 = β2 ϕ(w
1). This establishes a one to
one correspondence between the solutions of (24) and the fixed points of ψ.
Moreover, using (39) and noting that ϕ′(w)=δρ(w)(1−ρ(w)) we get
ψ′(w1) = νϕ′(w2)ϕ′(w1)
= νδ2pi1a(1−pi1a)pi2a(1−pi2a)
= νδ2pi1api1bpi2api2b (38)
so that the rest point x is stable if and only if ψ′(w1) < 1.
Theorem 2. The function ψ has either one, two or three fixed points, and
exactly one of the following mutually exclusive situations occurs.
(a) ψ has a unique fixed point w¯ with ψ′(w¯) ≤ 1. The corresponding x¯ is
the unique equilibrium of (7) and it is stable iff ψ′(w¯) < 1.
(b) ψ has two fixed points w− < w+ with either ψ
′(w−) < 1 = ψ
′(w+) or
ψ′(w+) < 1 = ψ
′(w−). The corresponding points x− and x+ are the
only rest points of (7). One of them is stable and the other is unstable.
(c) ψ has three fixed points w− < w¯ <w+ with ψ
′(w−) < 1, ψ
′(w+) < 1,
and ψ′(w¯) > 1. The corresponding points x−, x+ and x¯ are the only
rest points of (7), with x+ and x− stable and x¯ unstable.
Proof. Let us first observe that when δ = 0 the function ψ is constant and
has a unique fixed point w¯ = β1κ which falls in the situation (a). Let us
then consider the case δ > 0 so that ϕ is strictly decreasing. In this case ψ
is strictly increasing and bounded so that it must cross the identity at least
once. On the other hand, a direct calculation yields
ψ′(w) = νϕ′(β2ϕ(w))ϕ
′(w) (39)
ψ′′(w) = νβ2ϕ
′′(β2ϕ(w))ϕ
′(w)2 + νϕ′(β2ϕ(w))ϕ
′′(w)
=
νδ2eβ2ϕ(w)e2w
(1+eβ2ϕ(w))2(1+ew)4
[
β2δ − 2β2δ
1+eβ2ϕ(w)
− 2 sinh(w)
]
. (40)
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Recall that sinhx = 12(e
x − e−x), x ∈ R. The expression in the last square
bracket is strictly decreasing in w so that ψ′′ has exactly one zero w0 and
therefore ψ is strictly convex on (−∞, w0] and strictly concave on [w0,∞).
It follows that ψ can cross the identity at most three times (see Fig. 2) and
one of the mutually exclusive situations (a)-(c) must occur.
Figure 2 below illustrates case (c) where ψ has 3 fixed points with ψ′(w¯) > 1.
Depending on the values of the parameters κ, δ and ν, the graph of ψ might
shift to the right so that eventually w¯ and w+ may collapse into a single fixed
point producing situation (b), after which this double fixed point disappears
leading to case (a) with w− as the only fixed point. Symetrically, if the graph
of ψ is shifted to the left, w¯ may collapse with w− producing situation (b),
after which we fall into case (a) with unique fixed point w+. Note that
the case (a) with ψ′(w¯) = 1 can only occur when ψ has an inflection at w¯.
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
w¯
w
−
w+
Figure 2: Three fixed points with ψ′(w¯) > 1.
Since ψ is a strictly increasing function in one dimension, from dynamical
system theory for maps [26], it follows that for generic cases in Theorem
2, the fixed point is an orientation preserving sink when ψ
′
< 1 and an
orientation reversing source if ψ
′
> 1. In the latter case, two additional
fixed points appear (w− and w+) which correspond to two stable steady
states of the ODE system, indicating a topological change in the structure
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of the mean field dynamics which exhibits a bifurcation of the fold kind
[35].
In case of multiplicity the rest points satisfy an order relation. Namely,
let s = (1,−1,−1, 1) and consider the partial order ≤s induced by the
orthant
Ks = {x ∈ R4 : sixi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 4},
that is to say, x ≤s y if and only if si(yi − xi) ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , 4.
Proposition 1. Consider case (c) in Theorem 2 where ψ has three fixed
points w−<w¯<w+. Then the corresponding rest points x−, x+ and x¯ are
ordered as x− ≤s x¯ ≤s x+.
Proof. Since w1− = w− < w+ = w
1
+, and since ρ(·) is decreasing, the corre-
sponding Logit probabilities satisfy the inequality
pi1a− = ρ(w
1
−) > ρ(w
1
+) = pi
1a
+
so that the third and fourth equations in (24) yield x2a− ≥ x2a+ and x2b− ≤ x2b+ .
Now, since ϕ(·) is decreasing it follows that w2− = β2ϕ(w1−) > β2ϕ(w1+) = w2+
and similarly as before we get
pi2a− = ρ(w
2
−) < ρ(w
2
+) = pi
2a
+
so that the first and second equations in (24) yield x1a− ≤ x1a+ and x1b− ≥ x1b+ .
Hence x− ≤s x+. Analogous arguments yield x− ≤ x¯ and x¯ ≤s x+.
4.3 Ks-monotonicity and asymptotics of the dynamics
The symmetric sign distribution of the Jacobian coefficients in (30) moti-
vates the use of results of monotone or order-preserving dynamical systems
theory [45]. Such dynamical systems naturally occur in biology, chemistry,
physics and economics, where the notion of cooperative vector field shows
up. For those vector fields, a natural order relationship among trajectories
rises which severely restricts the long-term behavior of the positive semi-
flows. In the field of game theory, cooperative dynamics have been used to
study the asymptotics of best response dynamics as well as fictitious play
for supermodular games (see e.g. [6, 8, 9, 11, 31]). Here we use the results
for Ks-monotonic dynamical systems to describe the global behavior of the
learning dynamics in the 2× 2 traffic game. Note however that, in contrast
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with the previously cited applications in games, the nature of congestion
games leads to competitive rather than cooperative dynamics.
Let s = (1,−1,−1, 1) as in the previous section. The dynamics (7) turn out
to be Ks-monotone, which gives a more complete picture of its asymptotic
behavior. Recall [45, Smith] that a flow φt(x0) generated by a system of
ordinary differential equations{
x˙(t) = f(x(t)),
x(0) = x0
is called Ks-monotone if it preserves the partial order ≤s, namely, for all
x0, y0 ∈ U such that x0 ≤s y0 it holds that φt(x0) ≤s φt(y0) for all times
t ≥ 0 at which both solutions are defined.
We will use Lemma 2.1 in [45, Smith] which gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for the flux of an ODE system to be Ks-monotone in terms of
the signs of the entries of the Jacobian matrix of the system.
Proposition 2. Consider a 2× 2 traffic game. Then,
a) The mean field system (7) is Ks-monotone for s = (1,−1,−1, 1).
b) If there exists some T > 0 such that φT (x0) <s x0 or x0 <s φT (x0),
then the orbit φt(x0) converges to a rest point as t→∞.
Proof. According to [45, Lemma 2.1], a system is Ks-monotone if and only
if for all x ∈ U the matrix PsJ(x)Ps has non-negative off-diagonal elements,
where J(x) = Df(x) and Ps = diag (s1, . . . , sn). Since the Jacobian of (7) is
given by (30), the off-diagonal terms (PsJ(x)Ps)ij = sisjJij are non-negative
if and only if
s1s3 < 0 ; s1s4 > 0 ; s2s3 > 0 ; s2s4 < 0.
This holds for s = (1,−1,−1, 1) proving assertion a).
In order to prove b) we first note that for all i, r we have Cir(x-i) ∈ [Cr1 , CrN ],
from which it follows that all the forward orbits of (7) are bounded. More-
over, since the Jacobian (30) has only one zero in each row and column,
then J(x) is irreducible in the sense of [45]. Hence we may invoke [45,
Lemma 2.3(b)] which asserts precisely that the existence of T > 0 with ei-
ther φT (x0) <s x0 or φT (x0) >s x0 implies that the orbit φt(x0) converges
to a rest point.
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Theorem 3. Consider the mean field dynamics (7) for a 2 × 2 traffic
game. Then for almost all initial conditions x0 ∈ R4 the corresponding
orbit x(t) = φt(x0) converges to a rest point. Moreover, the union of the
basins of attraction of all the steady states is dense in R4.
Proof. We already noted that all forward orbits of (7) are bounded, and also
that there are finitely many rest points. Also, from Proposition 2 we know
that (7) is Ks-monotone and irreducible. Hence [45, Theorem 2.5] asserts
precisely that the orbits φt(x0) converge towards a rest point for almost all
initial conditions x0 ∈ R4, which establishes the first claim.
In order to prove the second assertion we use [45, Theorem 2.6] which states
that if X0 is an open, bounded, positively invariant set for a Ks-monotone
system, whose closure X¯0 contains finitely many rest points E, then the
union of the interiors of the basins of attraction Be of these rest points
∪e∈E∩X¯0 int(Be) is dense in X0. In our setting we may apply this result to
an open rectangle X0 = (−R,R)4 with R > max{Ca2 , Cb2}, which is easily
seen to be positively invariant for the mean field dynamics (7). Then the
union of the basins of attraction of the (finitely many) rest points is dense
in (−R,R)4 and we conclude by letting R→∞.
According to [45, Lemma 2.2] the matrix Ps(
∂φt
∂x0
(x0))Ps has all its entries
strictly positive for all t > 0, and therefore (7) cannot have an attracting
closed orbit nor two points of an ω-limit set related by ≤s. Also, by the
Perron-Frobenius Theorem [39] the spectral radius of Ps(
∂φt
∂x0
(x0))Ps is a
positive simple eigenvalue strictly larger in modulus than all the remain-
ing eigenvalues, and the corresponding eigenvector is positive. For further
properties of totally positive matrices we refer to [1].
Let us also observe that the Jacobian J(x) has an eigenvalue equal to
s(J(x)) = max{ℜ(λ) : λ eigenvalue of J(x)}.
Theorem 2.7 in [45] provides a set of equivalent conditions for the stability
condition s(J(x)) < 0. In particular, condition (iv) in [45, Theorem 2.7]
matches Routh-Hurwitz criterion [41], while the Gerschgorin criterion [40]
follows from condition (ii) in [45, Theorem 2.7].
From a bifurcation analysis viewpoint, a rest point loses stability when a sim-
ple real eigenvalue crosses from negative to positive [26]. Therefore, locally
stable Hopf bifurcations cannot occur for Ks-monotone systems, although
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unstable Hopf bifurcations cannot be excluded [35]. The only local bifurca-
tion involving an exchange of stability that a steady state can be involved in
is a steady state bifurcation. The next result provides additional informa-
tion on the dynamics (7) in the presence of an unstable equilibrium. Recall
that in this case there are 3 rest points x− ≤s x¯ ≤s x+ with x¯ unstable and
the other two stable.
Theorem 4. Consider the case (c) in Theorem 2 where ψ has three fixed
points w− < w¯ < w+. Then the unstable equilibrium x¯ is connected by two
monotone heteroclinic orbits to the stable rest points x− and x+.
Proof. The matrix J(x¯) is similar to A = PsJ(x¯)Ps which is irreducible and
has non-negative off-diagonal entries. Hence for α > 0 large enough αI +A
is non-negative and irreducible so that by the Perron-Frobenius Theorem
we have that s(αI +A) = α+ s(J(x¯)) is a simple eigenvalue of αI +A with
corresponding eigenvector v ≥ 0. It follows that s¯ = s(J(x¯)) is a simple
eigenvalue of J(x¯) with eigenvector v¯ = Psv, and since x¯ is unstable we have
s¯ > 0. The conclusion then follows by a straightforward application of [45,
Theorem 2.8] which establishes the existence of two C1 heteroclinic curves
y+ : [0,∞)→ R4 and y− : [0,∞)→ R4 such that
a) y±(r) = x¯± rv¯ + o(r) for r → 0 and y±(r)→ x± for r →∞,
b) for each r ≥ 0 the orbits started from y±(r) follow these curves and
are given by φt(y±(r)) = y±(re
s¯t) for all t ≥ 0, and
c) for all 0 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 we have y+(r1) ≤s y+(r2) and y−(r2) ≤s y−(r1).
Even though aK-monotone system cannot have an attracting periodic orbit,
when time is reversed these systems often do have attracting closed orbits.
It can be shown that every closed orbit has a simple Floquet multiplier [35]
which exceeds unity. This largest multiplier gives rise to a very unstable
cylinder manifold associated with the closed orbit which has monotonicity
properties [45]. In the specific case of (7) we do not know whether the time
reversed dynamics have an attracting closed orbit or not.
4.4 The 2× 2 case with symmetric players
Theorem 2 establishes three possible situations for the number and stability
of the rest points of the mean field dynamics. However, it does not provide
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explicit conditions on the data of the traffic game to predict which situation
will occur. We will show next that this is possible when the two players
are identical with β1 = β2. In the sequel we denote β this common value.
Introducing the function θ(w) = βϕ(w), the system (37) becomes
w1 = θ(w2)
w2 = θ(w1)
(41)
so that both w1 and w2 are fixed points of ψ(w) = θ ◦ θ(w).
Now, the function θ(w) decreases from β(κ+δ) at w = −∞ to βκ at w =∞,
so that it has a unique fixed point w¯ = θ(w¯). This yields a unique symmetric
solution w1 = w2 = w¯ for (41), which corresponds to a symmetric rest point
x¯ with x¯1a = x¯2a and x¯1b = x¯2b.
Note that if ψ admits another fixed point w1 6= w¯ then w2 = θ(w1) is also a
fixed point. Since θ is decreasing, if w1 < w¯ then w2 > w¯ and viceversa so
that w¯ is always the centermost fixed point of ψ. Hence case (b) in Theorem
2 cannot occur and ψ has either one or three distinct fixed points.
Theorem 5. Consider a 2 × 2 symmetric traffic game. Let x¯ be the sym-
metric rest point associated with the unique fixed point w¯ of θ.
(a) If ψ′(w¯) ≤ 1 then w¯ is the only fixed point of ψ and x¯ is the unique
rest point of (7). This rest point is stable if and only if ψ′(w¯) < 1.
(b) If ψ′(w¯) > 1 then ψ has exactly three fixed points w1 < w¯ < w2 with
w1=g(w2) and w2=g(w1), and we have
ψ′(w1) = ψ′(w2) = θ′(w1)θ′(w2)<1.
The symmetric rest point x¯ is unstable and there are two stable non-
symmetric equilibria: one defined by pi1a = ρ(w1), pi2a = ρ(w2), and
the other one with the identities of the players exchanged.
Proof. This follows from the previous comments and Theorem 2.
As seen above, in the symmetric case the number of rest points and their
nature are completely determined by the condition ψ′(w¯) < 1. The latter
can be checked directly from the data definining the game. More precisely,
denoting
c = (Ca1 + C
a
2 )− (Cb1 + Cb2) (42)
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Figure 3: Fixed points of ψ: ψ′(w¯) > 1 (left) vs ψ′(w¯) < 1 (right).
we have the following characterization established in [38]. For the sake of
completeness we include a proof. We recall that the hyperbolic arctangent
function is defined by arctanhx = 12 ln
(
1+x
1−x
)
for x ∈ (−1, 1).
Proposition 3. Consider the parameters µ = βδ and q = c/δ, as well as
the function h(x) = x arctanh
√
1−x +√1−x. Then ψ′(w¯) < 1 if and only
if |q| < h(4/µ).
Proof. Noting that ψ′(w¯) = θ′(w¯)2 the condition ψ′(w¯) < 1 is equivalent to
θ′(w¯) < −1. Since θ′(w¯) = −βδew¯(1 + ew¯)−2, denoting z¯ = 1 + ew¯ this can
be written as µ(z¯− 1) > z¯2 which translates into the fact that z¯ lies strictly
between the roots of z2 − µz¯ + µ = 0, that is z− < z¯ < z+ where
z± =
1
2 [µ ±
√
µ(µ− 4)]. (43)
Denoting w± = ln(z± − 1) this is equivalent to w− < w¯ < w+. Since w¯ is
the fixed point of θ(·) and since this function is decreasing, this is in turn
equivalent to the two inequalities
θ(w−) > w− ; θ(w+) < w+.
Now, observing that θ(w±) = βκ+ βδ/z±, the latter can be written as
ln(z− − 1)− βδ
z−
< βκ < ln(z+ − 1)− βδ
z+
.
Replacing the expression (43) for z± and denoting
f±(µ) =
1
µ
ln
(
µ±
√
µ(µ− 4)
2
− 1
)
− 2
µ±√µ(µ− 4)
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these inequalities can be expressed as
f−(µ) <
κ
δ
< f+(µ). (44)
Now, by direct computation one can check that f−(µ)+f+(µ) = −1 so that,
setting g(µ) = 2f+(µ) + 1, we may restate (44) in the symmetric form
−g(µ) < 1 + 2κ
δ
< g(µ).
The conclusion follows by noting that 1 + 2κ/δ = q and g(µ) = h(4/µ).
Figure 4 illustrates the stability region for the 2× 2 symmetric game. This
plot confirms that for µ = βδ < 4, which is equivalent to the condition
νδ2 < 16 in the comment after Theorem 1, the symmetric equilibrium x¯
is the unique rest point and it is stable. When θ′(w¯) crosses the value
−1 the symmetric steady state loses stability and two new stable equilibria
appear. This is due to the crossing of the imaginary axis by a simple negative
eigenvalue. Bifurcation theory for maps also predicts this situation which is
indicative of a fold bifurcation (see [35]).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1 steady state
3 steady states
unstable symmetric equilibrium
two stable non−symmetric equilibria
stable symmetric equilibrium
q = h (4/µ)
q =−h (4/µ)
µ = βδ
q
=
c
/
δ
Figure 4: Stability region for a 2×2 symmetric game in the µ-q parameters.
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5 Summary and future work
In this paper, we gave a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability
of equilibria for a 2× 2 symmetric traffic game. The main tool used was the
Routh-Hurwitz stability criterion for dynamical systems. We also exploited
the results for K-monotone systems to establish the asymptotic convergence
of the mean field dynamics.
With respect to Proposition 3 we conjecture that the condition |q| < h(4/βδ)
for having a unique stable equilibrium might still hold for the case of non-
symmetric players provided that we take β =
√
β1β2.
The extension to the general case with M routes and N players seems much
more difficult. However our numerical simulations show that the dynamics
still converge to equilibria and exhibit a certain regularity in the structure
of the attractors. Namely, for the case with identical players βi ≡ β, there
is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which x¯ir = x¯jr for all routes r and
different players i, j. When β is small this is the only rest point and a
global attractor, whereas for larger β the symmetric equilibrium becomes
unstable and there appear non-symmetric rest points (xi)i∈I with x
i 6= xj
for some i 6= j. However, these non-symmetric equilibria exhibit clusters of
players with the same estimate vector xi’s and, interestingly, the number of
players in each cluster is stable across the different equilibria. It would be
interesting to understand the reasons for such stable structure.
Another possible line of research is to investigate the extension of the results
from routing games to general 2-player games and beyond. Although some
asymptotic results were already described in [14] for the adaptive dynamics
in general finite games, they hold only in the regime where the Logit pa-
rameters βi are small. Since the results in this paper strongly exploit the
symetric structure of the Jacobian matrix in §3, it is unclear if and how the
arguments could be adapted to general games.
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